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There are ample evidences to show that a disabled person in African traditional (indigenous) 
communities such as a person with albinism, a person with angular kyphosis, a person with 
mental illness, or a person with physical disability go through a difficult life of intense social 
discrimination and stigma. One obvious evidence for this is to be found in the deeply 
normalized and socially accepted ableist language used against disabled persons in many 
African communities. The linguistic representations in forms of terms and phrases culturally 
and socially accepted as terms and phrases for disabled persons clearly shows the disdain for, 
and discriminations against such persons. For instance, among other terms and phrases, a 
person with albinism among the Yoruba people is termed ‘afin’ which means ‘horrible.’ In 
this essay, I defend two positions concerning the ableist representations of disabled persons in 
African languages. First, the normalized status of the ableist language against disabled 
persons is legitimated through an ontology that largely excludes disabled persons from the 
accepted community of beings and generally portrays disabled persons as entities lacking 
human personhood. If this is the case, then the moral obligations toward a fellow human 
being such as fair treatment and care for a disabled person is blurred in such an ontology. 
Second, I argue that nothing much would be achieved in any attempt to overcome the ableist 
representation of disability in African languages if attention is not first paid to a critique of 
the ontological representations of disability within African framework of thought, 
representations that legitimate the use of such ableist terms and phrases. I conclude that it 
could be a source of harm if certain moral guidelines are absent in its use. 
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There is an intrinsic nexus between being and language. What is, is always expressed in 
language. Martin Heidegger rightly describes language as the ‘house of being’ in which 
Dasein dwells.1 Heidegger’s words show that language plays a crucial role in our 
understanding of being. Heidegger, in Being and Time, describes language as a modality of 
the uncovering of entities as entities. Language is, at every point, embedded in and 
presupposes being. It is that out of which persons speak and on which they depend. This 
dependence is described by Heidegger as a ‘showing’ (Zeige) that reaches into all sphere of 
being and allows what is to appear and mis-appear (rerscheinen) out of them. Heidegger’s 
point is that it is language that first brings an existent into its being or that unconceals it and 
brings it to the open. Being is discovered and illuminated through language. Language 
enables humans in any place of dwelling to bring forth and preserve beings. Linguistic terms 
arise from an encounter with beings. Such linguistic terms have finite natures that are revised 
and updated as reality unfolds and the human experience and understanding of entities 
improves.2 
 In the history of philosophy, philosophers have been conscious of this intrinsic 
relationship between language and being. But the exact nature of that relationship has, like 
virtually all philosophical problems, resulted in a perennial debate dating back as far as 
Plato’s Cratylus,3 the naïve realism of Aristotle and the neo-Thomists and the many facets of 
twentieth century analytic philosophy. Perhaps, Richard Rorty, to me, provides the most apt 
description of the perennial debate in philosophy concerning the exact way language should 
be used to describe entities in his brief but captivating review of Saul Kripke’s Naming and 
Necessity.4 In Rorty’s words, 
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Since Kant, philosophers have prided themselves on transcending the ‘naive realism’ 
of Aristotle and of common sense. On this naive view, there is a right way of 
describing things, corresponding to how they are in themselves, to their real essences. 
Scientists, philosophers like to say, are especially prone to adopt this unreflective 
view. They think they are discovering the secrets of nature, but philosophers know 
that they are really constituting objects by synthesising the manifold of intuition, or 
predicting the occurrence of sensations, or wielding instruments to cope with the flux 
of experience, or something equally pragmatic and anthropocentric. This 
condescending attitude towards common sense, Aristotle and science has been shared 
by people as far apart as Russell and Bergson, Whitehead and Husserl, James and 
Nietzsche, Carnap and Cassirer.5 
 
Rorty adds that, 
Until Kripke came along, almost the only exceptions to this consensus were the 
Catholics and the Marxists. Between the two Vatican Councils, neo-Thomists tried to 
explain that the ‘naive’ Aristotelian view was the sound intuitive belief of the 
common man, and that Cartesian subjectivism, Kantian transcendental idealism and 
positivistic empiricism were successively more virulent forms of a mad modern 
heresy. But nobody listened, and after the aggiornamento the neo-Thomists pretty 
well gave up. Old-time Marxists, who had cut their teeth on Lenin’s Materialism and 
Empirio-Criticism, used to argue that Russell was just the latest English version of the 
‘bourgeois formalism’ which Hegel had diagnosed in Kant. But nobody listened to 
them either, and after the discovery of the young, humanist, pragmatist Marx they, 
too, gave up. Just when it seemed that the dialectic which Kant began had culminated 
in universal acceptance of the relaxed pragmatism of Wittgenstein and Quine, Kripke 
exploded his bomb.6 
 
What is clear from Rorty’s analysis of the nexus between being and language in the history of 
philosophy is that there are two broad perspectives that have evolved from the perennial 
debate. The first can simply be stated as: our linguistic representation of being is basically 
determines by the being itself. This is the naïve realist view attributed to Aristotle, 
perpetuated by a handful of others in philosophy’s history and by our esteemed guest today, 
Saul Kripke. The second, mostly attributed to Kant’s transcendental idealism, holds that we 
structure and constitute what an entity is by putting ideas together; in Rorty’s words, ‘… we 
decide what counts as an ‘object’ by putting ideas together. We build worlds inside our minds 
by tying concepts together so as to package sensation more conveniently.’7 
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 In this essay, I am primarily concerned with the implication(s) of approaching the 
linguistic-ontology relation through the second approach for disabled persons in African 
traditions. For the sage philosophers of African traditions – ancestors, forefathers, the elite 
class, or whatever we may conceptualise them to be – are in many ways Kantian in their 
linguistic representation of entities. There is a strong commitment in African ontology to 
finite transcendence in Heideggerian terms. The African transcends beings in order to 
conceptualise them. The African is thus the fundament of her ontology, whose place in the 
scheme of things is key and vital to the understanding of the idea being in African traditions. 
It is the person who transcends into the openness, the happening or event-ing, of being, into 
nothing as a field or region of encounter to establish and re-establish what is. In his/her 
transcending of beings or what brings him/her into being, the person is able to do the Kantian 
dance of relating one thing to another; connecting one experience to another to make them 
meaningful; he/she is propelled to move from one state of affairs to another from now to not 
now, from what is to what is not, to form new concepts, new interpretations of things and re-
enact old interpretations.8 Hence Heidegger sees the individual as the seat of finite 
transcendence and the intrinsic possibility of ontology.9 
 Bearing this in mind, I begin in the next section by unfolding the ontological status of 
disability cum queerness in African traditions as primarily (not completely of course,) ableist, 
prejudicial and discriminative in nature. I then proceed to show how such an ontology of 
disability justifies the ableist linguistic representation of disability in African traditions since 
the latter invariably evolves from the former. I conclude by relating why the Kripkean, 
Aristotelian naïve realist approach may be essential in overcoming the prejudicial 
understanding of disability in African traditions. 
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In African ontology, different categories of beings exist. They include the divinities, the 
ancestors, manipular forces, and the human person. Persons with disability such as a person 
with albinism, a person with angular kyphosis, a person with mental illness, or a person with 
physical disability, would however not fit within these categories of beings. For instance, in 
African traditions, it is impossible to conceive of, or picture, a person with albinism or a 
person would angular kyphosis joining the ancestral cult after finishing his or her earthly 
course of existence. Hence, persons with disability are categorised within African thought as 
queer beings. An entity is categorised as queer if it is at variance with what is usual or 
normal, that is, if it differs in some odd or strange way from what ordinarily is. Something 
queer is something suspicious, unconventional and strange. Note that when the word 
queerness is used, it immediately presents the idea of oddness, difference, and unusualness. 
But beyond these, it intrinsically connotes counterfeit, worthless, questionable and 
suspicious. Hence when we talk about queer money, for instance, we do not only mean that 
the money is unusual or different but that it is questionable, suspicious, and worthless 
counterfeit. Understanding disabled persons as queer beings in these senses is much felt in 
sub-Saharan African societies. Persons with disability in African communities are thus 
considered as having lesser status than human beings in the category of beings. A queer being 
in African ontology is a being that may visibly appear as a human being but, due to lack of, 
or possession of, certain qualities, is seen as not fitting within the categories of humans or 
other categories due to its unusual nature. Hence queer beings may look human but they are 
not regarded as humans nor treated as such in African traditions. The list of the kinds of 
entities that may fall within this category of beings vary from one sub-Saharan African 
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culture to the other. Generally, however, persons with one form of disability or the other 
would fall under this group. In some other cases, twins, triplets and quadruplets, small 
persons, persons with angular kyphosis, persons born with little finger and the like would be 
treated as queer beings. 10 
The treatment of queer beings varies too across African (as well as non-African) 
cultures. Due to their unusual nature, some are seen as some kind of favourable divine 
presence that deserves care and reverencing while others are seen as unfavourable divine 
presence, some sort of curse or punishment from supernatural entities, that deserves to be 
done away with or, at least abhorred. Take for example, the birth of twins; in some cultures 
such as the Yoruba culture, twins or triplets are reverenced and taken to be a good sign of 
favour from the ancestors, divinities and the Supreme Being. They are therefore expected to 
be treated as princes and princesses. However, a number of communities around Abuja 
Nigeria, such as Yaba, Gulida, Gomani, Tepase, Dawaki, Warambi, Kiyi and Shetuko 
villages are still till date engaged in the killing of twins because they are considered as queer 
beings that bring bad-luck. We recall, of course, the work of the Scottish missionary Mitchell 
Slessor to abolish the killing of twin in sub-Saharan Africa, particularly Nigeria. Hence, in 
most cases, queer being are killed immediately after death, thrown into the forest or, in cases 
where they escape being killed mostly due to modern social structures, they face 
maltreatment, stigmatization and social exclusion for much of their lives. The social 
institutions on ground are therefore properly structured to establish, perpetuate and maintain 
the queerness and ableist treatment of such entities.  
To illustrate, let us consider for a moment albinism as a disability. In African 
ontology, persons with albinism may in all respect visibly appear to be human except, of 
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course, for the lack of pigmentation, but they are, in fact, excluded from the human category 
of beings. Rather, persons with albinism are viewed as queer, unusual beings. Their unusual 
nature stems not only from their visible physical difference but also from the ideas about the 
nature of their being presented and represented down the ages in the worldviews of African 
traditional societies. One important distinction between human being and queer beings with 
particular reference to persons with albinism is the presence and absence of the spirit element 
of the human being that lives on in the spiritual realm of existence after physical death. It is 
evident from African traditions that while human beings possess not just vital force but spirit, 
which makes them capable of becoming an ancestor, a manipular spirit, or a deified divinity, 
persons with albinism as queer beings may have vital force but do not have spirit. It is 
therefore not possible, for instance, to talk of a person with albinism becoming an ancestor 
after death. A person with albinism is therefore less of a being than a human being. Such a 
person is also not viewed in the same way a human being is viewed as possessing certain 
essential ontological qualities such as coming into being with a destiny chosen before the 
Supreme Being. Rather, the coming into being of a person with albinism is viewed as an 
outcome of a curse placed on the child bearer, the husband of the child bearer or the family at 
large due to some wrong doing, or the result of the punishment received by a child bearer, the 
husband of the child bearer or the family at large from a higher force (such as an ancestor or 
divinity) due to some wrong doing. Hence a family that gives birth to a person with albinism 
is seen as unfavoured by some higher forces and faces ridiculing within the community of 
selves. For this reason, persons with albinism are conceived as a human other, something 
different from the approved and accepted notion of a human being. A person with albinism as 
an other is thus not expected to participate or take the lead in human social and religious 
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activities within the community. It is not mandatory for him to receive proper burial rites 
even though he succeeds in raising a family, having children and living a community 
accepted form of life. Basically a person with albinism is not expected to be treated as a 
human being. 
 Another interrelated point to be underscored about albinism in African traditions can 
best be understood if we, first of all, say a few things about the fundamental need for 
preservation of the community of beings in African traditions. Communal harmony and 
equilibrium is essential in any African community because beings or forces interact and find 
meaning in the community. The community itself is an aggregate of interacting cosmic forces 
as well as structures established to foster and sustain the established and most needed 
interaction. Accepted beings within the ontological structure and the community are therefore 
intrinsically interwoven and cannot be conceived at any point as existing separately. Cosmic 
forces find meaning in their space of dwelling. Consider, for example, the being of the 
ancestor. It is impossible to conceive an ancestor as separate from the kin. This is because it 
is within his kin that he is not only venerated, but also where a shrine is erected for him; it is 
because of him that the whole kin come together, at least once a year, to pay homage and 
respect to him. He is called on issues of morality, conflict, social problems, health matters, 
joys and virtually all events confronting the family. This is where his existence finds meaning 
and where his force becomes useful. In the same vein, the kin also does not conceive itself at 
any point as independent of its ancestors. On social, religious, moral, spiritual, health, 
political matters or otherwise, they seek the decision or consent of their ancestors, they 
appease him when any family member does wrong in order to calm his temper and reaffirm 
their loyalty to him, they thank him for the birth of a child, for good harvest, for protection 
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from enemies and so on. It is a reciprocal relationship. Benezet Bujo says, for example, 
regarding the relationship between a person and his/her ancestor on health matters that, 
The community of the diseased is also not forgotten since a disease might be caused 
by the disturbed relationship of the patient with the world of those who have passed 
away... Health, therefore, implies safe integration into the bi-dimensional community 
as the place where life grows... [For] If interpersonal relationships are not well 
maintained, sickness can affect the members.11 
 
Hence interpersonal relationship is necessary for survival of any being in the 
ontological structure. This is one reason why communal harmony is essential. It is what 
Stephen O. Okafor captures as commensality. Commensality, in practice, means “the act of 
eating together or sharing in a common meal”. However, from what has been said above, it 
becomes necessary to note its primary and secondary senses. In its primary sense, it is the 
philosophical or ideological criterion for all forms of social or political relationships; a 
mechanism which militates against social excommunication and tension ridden rivalries. This 
surely has enormous benefits for the development of any community or society. It makes for 
peace and social harmony. In its secondary sense, it is the possibility and practice of sharing 
in all forms of common and conventional meals on family, communal or national levels; or 
between individuals; between the living and the living-dead, between the community and 
their divinities or Supreme Being.12 Therefore all cosmic forces interact and relate in the 
established structures of the community to promote peace, order, and tranquillity and to 
checkmate ill-behaviour or anything that seems to threaten the much needed unity of beings. 
The famous lines of John Mbiti readily comes to mind here, 
Only in terms of other people does the individual become conscious of his own being, 
his own duties, his privileges and responsibilities towards himself and towards other 
people. When he suffers, he does not suffer alone but with the corporate group; when 
he rejoices, he rejoices not alone but with his kinsmen, his neighbours and relatives 
whether dead or alive. Whatever happens to the individual happens to the whole 
group and whatever happens to the whole group happens to the individual. The 
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individual can only say: “I am, because we are; and since we are, therefore I am.” 
This is the cardinal point in the understanding of the African view of man.13 
 
 Another importance of the relationship and interaction of forces in the Esan 
community is vividly seen in the idea of causality or causal agency. As Polycarp Ikuenobe 
says, 
The proper or harmonious interaction among forces and lack thereof, provide the 
basis for explaining causal phenomena with respect to various events or occurrences. 
Harmony in interaction among forces brings about good events and lack of harmony 
in interaction among forces brings about bad events such as death and disease. Human 
actions in relation to community and nature are central to the ability to create 
harmony.14 
 
Every event, happening, or phenomenon experienced in the community is caused by a causal 
agency – physical or non-physical. All beings in African societies are causal agencies; and 
events in the community are explained with reference to them. Beings and their interaction 
are therefore the basis for the explanation, predication, and control of events in the 
community. One point must be stressed here. Spiritual forces are not the only causes of 
events in the African community. Indeed, all beings are involved – physical and non-
physical. G. Sogolo says, for example, about the Azande that,        
They provide descriptions of objects and explanations of events in theoretical 
categories not tied to magical or religious beliefs. The Azande have principles and 
beliefs about how to hunt for animals… the kind of soil that would produce harvest… 
knowledge of nutritional techniques, the food that nourishes and that which does not; 
that which is poisonous and that which is not; it would therefore be a mistake to 
suggest that in these areas of their daily activities the Azande always resort to magical 
or religious explanations.15 
 
Therefore, causality in African communities reflects the interaction between the physical and 
non-physical in human existence. The African operates with the idea that every event has a 
cause but not every event has a scientifically explainable or verifiable cause in a positivistic 
sense. Chinua Achebe also depicts this about Igbo metaphysics in his classic Things fall 
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Apart. This is typified in Okoli’s death. The only thing we know about Okoli is that he joined 
the new religion, that he “brought the church into serious conflict with the clan… by killing 
the sacred python, the emanation of the god of water… The royal python was the most 
revered animal in Mbanta and all the surrounding clans. It was addressed as “Our Father” and 
was allowed to go wherever it chose”.16 When the people learned that Okoli had killed the 
python on account of the new religion, they were infuriated; yet, they believed the gods 
would fend for themselves: “It is not our custom to fight for our gods… Let us not presume to 
do so now. If a man kills the sacred python in the secrecy of his hut, the matter lies between 
him and the god”.17 And surely enough, Okoli fell ill and died, showing that “… the gods 
were still able to fight their own battles”.18 
 In sum, the two main reasons why communal harmony is very essential in the 
community are: (i) to guarantee survival, and (ii) to provide causal explanations. Now, if 
communal harmony and equilibrium is this important, then the community has the crucial 
responsibility of preventing or doing away with anything considered a threat to the 
preservation to the preservation of community. For instance, a morally bankrupt person, or a 
person not living by community approved standard is considered a threat to the structure of 
beings. This is because a morally bankrupt person doing things that are frowned at by the 
ancestors or divinities would cause frictions and unhealthy relationship between her kin and 
her ancestors. This brings about disequilibrium in the relationship among beings and becomes 
a threat to communal harmony. For this reason, morally bankrupt persons in African 
traditions may be considered persons in the ontological sense as having all the necessary 
constituents of the beings of persons, but would not be considered as persons in the social 
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sense and would be stripped of all social status and positions until she repents of the 
wrongdoing. 
 Similarly, many queer beings are seen as threat to the established harmony of being 
and to the vital force of the human being. For instance, many African traditions codify within 
their worldviews, the need to avoid and abhor persons with albinism. If persons with albinism 
are beings produced from the anger and punitive measure of supernatural entities, then 
associating with them may lead to suffering from the same vengeful anger that brought them 
into being. Hence, children are told to stay away from such persons; pregnant women are 
threatened not to look at persons with albinism else they give birth to something like them; 
persons with albinism are largely excluded from social gatherings or activities. This is 
because having relationship with persons with albinism is believed to result in incurring the 
wrath of some supernatural entity, which will bring about frictions in the community of 
beings. In fact, among the Yoruba people, they are believed to be the properties of the 
supernatural entities that begot them. Hence it is conventional within the Yoruba culture to 
make such persons serve in the shrine of a divinity rather than stay home with the family. In 
this way, persons with albinism are completely isolated from the conventional human society 
and become servants to some chief priest in some isolated shrine. 
 Again, there are two immediate consequences of the idea that persons with albinism 
come into being through the punitive acts of some supernatural forces. First, as it was 
common in many sub-Saharan African cultures, the new born infant with albinism is killed or 
thrown away in the forest as a form of sacrifice to appease the angry supernatural entity. 
Hence, it was customary to kill at birth infants born with albinism. Although this occurrence 
has reduced due to the experience of modernity, it has not completely been eradicated. There 
 Caribbean Journal of Philosophy 
 





are still indications of the killing of infants with albinism in many communities in Africa till 
date. Second, persons with albinism who for some reason survive death as infants are thought 
to possess some peculiar kind of force that can be manipulated or harnessed for certain ends. 
Medicine men spread the idea that body parts of persons with albinism can be manipulated 
with the aid of manipular forces to, for instance, provide protection, good health, and wealth 
for humans. In this scenario, persons with albinism are nothing more than things or objects 
whose force can be extracted or harnessed for certain ends. Those who are involved in the 
dismembering and killing of persons with albinism do not feel the guilt that a human being 
has been killed because such persons are not in the first place considered human. There is no 
spirit element departing the dead body of the person with albinism to a spiritual realm of 
existence as, for instance, a manipular force seeking revenge for her death or an ancestor 
joining the ancestral cult. Hence, in the last few decades there has been a notorious history of 
killings of persons with albinism in modern times for such reasons as luck charms, wealth 
and health, with East Africa (particularly Tanzania) making notorious headlines. 
 Hence, the othering of disabled persons as queer beings in African ontology and the 
manner in which the queerness of their beings has been presented and represented through 
history of African cultures have had dire consequences for such persons and continue to do 
so. Persons with disability do not only face ontological exclusion but social exclusion. Their 
othering is deeply entrenched in the ontological and social institutions of the African 
community. More so, it is preserved and perpetuated in linguistic forms that are strongly 
ableist. Such linguistic representations, I will show in the section that follows, are 
unavoidable outcome of the ontological structuring of disability in African societies. 
III 
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If you live in an African community for a short while, you will quickly come to know of the 
linguistic terms used in denoting various forms of disability. If you barely understand African 
ontology or general notions of being, you may become in awe or find it difficult to 
understand why such concepts have been formulated the way they have, but may simply use 
them to denote and designate in a naïve manner, such entities. But I argue here that such 
concepts are the way they are, and are as derogatory, abliest and discriminating as they are 
not because they are naively construed but because they are carefully structured ideas and 
beliefs about the being of such forms of disability that has become inherent in the thought 
systems of the people. 
 Take for instance, persons with albinism; in African traditions, the perception about 
albinism and the consequent ableism and discrimination against persons with albinism is 
vividly captured in the generic words or names used to represent persons with albinism. 
Among the Yoruba people, for instance, persons with albinism are called afin, which means 
‘horrible’. It is common among people in South Africa to refer to a person with albinism as 
isishawa, which means ‘cursed’. In Zimbabwe, persons with albinism are referred to as sope, 
a word used to indicate that such persons are possessed with evil spirits. In Tanzania, persons 
with albinism are referred to as zeruzeru, meaning ‘ghost people’. These are just a few of the 
many derogatory and ableist terms used against persons with albinism in many African 
societies. Such words are taken as an apt description of reality. They become part of the 
people’s consciousness, both young and old. Hence, when a group of young children are 
walking back home from school and catch sight of a person with albinism in some village in 
Tanzania, they are not in doubt of what entity in reality they are perceiving or encountering; 
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they are encountering the reality within their particular world of a zeruzeru; so they take to 
their heels while screaming ‘zeruzeru, zeruzeru…’.  
 The ideas about the coming-to-be of persons with disability thus influence greatly the 
terms and concepts used to represent different forms of disability. Theories of being therefore 
legitimate concepts and terms for disabled persons in many cultures. The Yoruba theory of 
the creation of disabled persons holds that the maker of human beings Obatala grew tired and 
thirsty from making human beings and needed to quench his thirst. So he had a little bit too 
much of the traditional Yoruba wine, the palm wine and then continued his act of creation. 
However, being drunk, his hands became shaky, his focus unsteady and he lost his precision. 
The result was errors in the creation of human beings, or the creation of incomplete 
humans.19 Hence, any form of disability is attributed to the drunkenness of Obatala. As Clyde 
Ford puts it, 
His [Obatala’s] fingers had become unsteady. And some of the figures he next created 
reflected his impaired condition: they were albinos, cripples, hunchbacks, dwarfs or 
deaf mutes. But in his drunken state Obatala failed to notice these deformities… 
When the haze of the palm wine wore off, Obatala looked around and, seeing all the 
malformed beings, realized what misery his drunkenness had wrought. His heart was 
filled with compassion and remorse. “Never,” he said to himself, “never again will I 
drink palm wine. And I shall always be the protector of those who have been created 
with deformities and imperfections.”20 
 
This explains why in traditional Yoruba societies, a disabled person is sent to the shrine of a 
priest of Obatala to serve the one that protects him or her. On the surface level, it seems, as 
many Yorubas would argue, that the Yoruba tradition has much respect for disabled persons 
as such persons are properties of the divine. But a careful examination reveals the exact 
opposite. On the one hand, the idea that they are properties of Obatala is a clever way of 
completely isolating such ones from the society of persons without disability. It is a 
convenient reason for some families to shy away from their responsibility and obligation to 
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care for such persons and simply live them to the care of Obatala in some shrine. On the other 
hand, the linguistic terms used to represent such persons do not indicate any sort of reverence 
or respect for their being. As mentioned above, naming a person with albinism afin (horrible) 
does not in any way dignify someone belonging to a deity. The same puzzle can be noticed 
concerning the manner in which the Yorubas treat little people and persons with kyphosis. 
While such persons pay be generally referred to as Eri Orisa [the possession of the divine), 
they are also ambivalently conceptualised as unnatural beings suffering from the vengeance 
of the divinities.21 
IV 
Humans have the natural propensity to create ideas. The human mind is a vast territory of 
uncharted possibilities. By merely perceiving and experiencing, the world, we create, conjure 
up, describe and re-describe entities; we structure and craft out essences and necessities and 
then we start the process all over again. A manifold of human ideas and concepts about being 
in general and beings in particular evolve from this sort of Kantian-Heideggerian 
transcendental process of idea and concept formulation. But this process as essential as it may 
be for understanding human experiences has its limitations. It has the tendency of blurring the 
exact nature of the objects and subjects we perceive as it does to disability in African 
traditions. A naïve realist approach is a useful complementary form of conceptualising the 
things we perceive. Albinism, for instance, does not have an African sense or an Asian sense. 
It is a term designating the same thing in all possible words. The same thing applies to being 
with dwarfism, blindness, deafness, stuttering or epilepsy. It is what it is, not what we wish it 
to be through our glandulous mental theorisation; mental theorisation that not only obscures 
the actual nature of the object/subject perceived, but consistently promote ableist 
 Caribbean Journal of Philosophy 
 





representations of such an object/subject. Albinism, for instance, in all possible words, refers 
to the condition where a living thing, plant or animal, completely or partially lacks the needed 
element(s) for normal pigmentation or colouring. An entity that has albinism therefore has a 
pale, milk, red, or white presentation of colour different from the normal colouring of 
members in its group. Hence, an entity with albinism is thus visibly different from others of 
its kind. In plants, for instance, the complete or partial lack of chlorophyll and chloroplast 
membranes results in albinism in plants. Such plants may then display pale colouring 
different from that of its class or group. Our interest in this work however, is on albinism 
specifically in humans or persons. Albinism in persons refers to a condition where a person 
partially or completely lacks pigmentation or colouring due to certain biological conditions 
such as the absence of melanin (the substance that gives a person its colour) and other genetic 
mutations. A person with albinism (PWA) visibly lacks pigment in all or some part of the 
body including skin, hair, and the iris and pupil of the eyes. Such persons generally have pale, 
milk, or pink coloured skin, white, milk or blonde hair, and light coloured (blue, pink or light 
brown) eyes. Focussing on the naïve realist, rigid designator conception of disability may 
help reduce the ableist ideas of disability that is found not only in African cultures, but in 
virtually all cultures of the world.  
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